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Plus ça change…? 
 
PETER LEHR 
 
South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg1 
 
 
Contrary to the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the Indian Ocean has not so far 
developed an overarching security system that could meet the challenge of 
maritime security. Based on the findings of a research project2, I will give an 
analysis of the current post-Cold War security environment in the Indian Ocean in 
the perception of leading members of its epistemic community: Is the current 
security environment in the Indian Ocean conducive for the development of a 
maritime security system as suggested in the literature? Is there any real interest in 
such ventures? And, is the Indian Ocean perceived as a 'region' at all? I am of the 
opinion that all these questions have to be answered in the negative for the time 
being.3 
Most books and articles on International Relations nowadays start with 
remarking how dramatically the world has changed after  the end  of the  Cold War 
                                                 
1 Peter Lehr is lecturer in Politics, Department of Political Science, South-Asia Institute, 
University of Heidelberg (e-mail: lehr@sai.uni-heidelberg.de). 
2 The research project Panchayati Raj in the Indian Ocean – Towards a Maritime Security 
Regime was funded by Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, from January 2000 to 
December 2001. Members of the author's research team were Ms. Maike Tuchner, Mr. 
Karsten Frey M. A. and Mr. Hendrick Lehmann M. A. . Supervisors were Prof. Dr. Subrata 
K. Mitra and Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema. The author and his research team would like 
to thank Prof. Mitra and Prof. Cheema for their unfaltering support and Fritz Thyssen 
Foundation for making the project possible. 
3 In some respect, the article will try to carry the work done by Booth and Dowdy dated 
1985 a little further, thus showing what has changed in the span of seventeen years, how it 
has changed, why it has changed and what the implications are for the near future. See 
Booth, Ken/Dowdy, William L.:  "Structure and Strategy in the Indian Ocean Naval 
Developments: Taking Stock, in  Dowdy, William L./Trood, Russell B (eds.):  The Indian 
Ocean. Perspectives on a Strategic Arena.  Durham: Duke University Press 1985, pp. 80-
97. 
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in the beginning of the nineties. Of course, the authors of those books and articles 
go on to argue that these changes manifested themselves differently in different 
regions of the world – more positively in regions like Europe, more negatively, or 
at least: less positively in regions like the Asia-Pacific. But only very few authors 
would argue that there has been no impact whatsoever on their respective region of 
research. But still, one can enumerate some regions of the world where the impact 
of the end of the Cold War and the demise of one superpower has had only a 
marginal – or at best: ambivalent – effect on the regional security environment. 
This article is dealing with one of these regions, the Indian Ocean.  
 
Map: The Indian Ocean Area4 
 
                                                 
4 Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: "Indian Ocean Maps", University of 
Texas at Austin,  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/indianoceanarea.jpg (Download 
11/11/02). 
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With approximately 74 million square kilometres and roughly 20 per cent of the 
global ocean, the Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean after the Pacific and the 
Atlantic. Geographically, it is situated between the two bigger ones, thus serving as 
a natural "transit lounge" for most of the traffic from the Atlantic to the Pacific and 
vice versa. Two key characteristics distinguishes the Indian Ocean from the 
Atlantic and the Pacific: First, only one fifth of the total trade is conducted among 
the countries of the Indian Ocean themselves,5 80 per cent of the trade is extra-
regional (for example, crude oil to Europe, the USA and Japan). In the Atlantic and 
the Pacific, the proportion is exactly vice versa. Second, contrary to the Atlantic 
and the Pacific as "open" oceans, the Indian Ocean can only be accessed through 
several choke points: From the West via Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of 
Madagascar, from the North via the Bab el-Mandeb at the end of the Red Sea and 
the Straits of Hormuz at the exit of the Persian Gulf, from the East via the Straits of 
Malacca, the Sunda and Lombok-Straits and the Ombai-Wetar-Straits. 
The modern history of the Indian Ocean is a history of perennial regional 
conflicts – a struggle for power in the Persian Gulf, a bitter conflict in South Asia 
(the Indo-Pakistani wars), wars and unrest in Southeast Asia (e. g., the so-called 
Konfrontasi between Indonesia on the one side and Malaysia and Singapore on the 
other, and, nowadays, secession of East-Timor from Indonesia and communal 
clashes within Indonesia itself), seemingly endless war at the Horn of Africa and – 
until very recently – in Southern Africa. Because of the possibility of an 
interruption of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), these conflict always 
have the potential to acquire an international dimension as well. For the most part 
of modern history, the Indian Ocean has been a 'British Lake', the security of which 
was guaranteed by ships of the Royal Navy until the termination of all security 
commitments 'East of Suez' in 1971. From the mid-sixties onwards, a steady 
increase of superpower presence paralleling the decrease of British presence was 
noticeable. Although this power shift made a difference in the perception of several 
Indian Ocean Rim states since they felt the danger of being drawn into the 
superpower conflict, it did not make a difference in the overall security of the 
Indian Ocean itself: The possible power vacuum created by the British was 
effectively filled even before it developed, so that naval ambitions of regional 
states had no change to be put into reality – although they were formulated 
nevertheless.  
 
THE INDIAN OCEAN:  STILL AN INSECURITY 'COMMUNITY'  
 
Writing in 1985, Ken Booth and William L. Dowdy argued that because of the 
plenitude of military, economic, religious and racial insecurities and threats, the 
Indian Ocean "might be dubbed a kaleidoscope of crisis, and not merely an 'arc'".6 I 
                                                 
5 Porter, Ian W.: "The Indian Ocean Rim",  African Security Review, Vol. 6, No. 6, 1997 
(http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/6.6/Porter.html). 
6 Ibid., p. 81. 
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argue in this article that this still holds true – the end of the Cold War and the 
superpower conflict notwithstanding.  
On the military level, a plethora of conflicts exist along the all-important 
SLOCs: from the Bab el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz along the coastline of 
South Asia to the Straits of Malacca and – by way of geographical extension – to 
the South China Sea. At the Horn of Africa, consisting of Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya, the hapless citizens are virtually living in a 
Hobbesian environment formed by seemingly endless civil wars and streams of 
refugees fleeing from here to there and back. In the Gulf area, conflicts are far from 
being settled: Iraq continues to defy UN resolutions7, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) members are again quarrelling with each other and Iran is busily acquiring 
new military muscles with an emphasis of beefing up its navy. In South Asia, the 
Sri Lankan civil war and the Indo-Pakistani conflict are far from being solved, too. 
With the introduction of 'real' (contrary to previously only 'imagined') nuclear 
weapons, the latter conflict has the potential to grow into a hot – and even nuclear 
– war since both parties have not yet developed a set of nuclear safeguards 
comparable to those in force between the USA and the former USSR. In Southeast 
Asia, we watch Indonesia slowly drifting towards a civil war and perhaps even 
disintegrating in the process: the transformation from the authoritarian "orde baru" 
(new order) of Suharto towards a more democratic form of government has been 
stalled, radical Islamists are on the rise and the once all-powerful military seems to 
be unable to make a new bid for power to save the nation again. The only sub-
region which can boast of an improvement in regard of the security environment is 
Southern Africa, where the end of the South African apartheid regime has paved 
the way towards normalization of interstate relations and towards the formation of 
a nascent security community via the Southern African Development Council 
(SADC). 
On the economic sector, the Indian Ocean region is still to be called a 
community of weak states: Most Indian Ocean Rim states still fall under the rubric 
of "Low Developed Countries" (LDP) with an average annual GDP per head 
ranging between US $ 230 (Mozambique) to US $ 30.000 (Singapore).8 Even the 
former "tiger cubs" Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have 
witnessed a (temporary) end of the "Asian Miracle" and are still in the throes of the 
Asian economic crisis. Whether the new Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), founded in 1996 at Port Louis, Mauritius and 
obviously patterned after APEC, will be able to ameliorate the economic problems 
of the region remains unclear at the moment. 
On the religious and racial level – often interconnected – we find a civil war in 
Sudan conducted by the dominant northern Muslim part of the country against the 
Christian tribes in the South. In parts of South Asia and Southeast Asia, we observe 
                                                 
7 The article was finished in July 2002, but the Iraqi defiance did not have come to an end 
shortly before it was published end of November 2002. 
8 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Enhancing the Trade and Investment 
Environment in the Indian Ocean Rim Region. Full Report. Canberra: 
ASARC/RSPAS/Australian National University December 2000, pp. 158-177. 
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communal clashes between Muslims and Hindus (India), Muslims and Buddhists 
(Sri Lanka) and Muslims and Christians (Indonesia). Iran and Afghanistan – even 
after the end of the Taliban regime –  are still being accused of exporting Islamic-
fundamentalist terrorism into neighbouring states, thus destabilizing both the 
internal order of these states as well as international relations. For the very same 
reasons, even Taliban-friendly Pakistan temporarily entered the list of possible 
"rogue states" in the aftermath of September 11 and the botched attack on the 
Indian Lok Sabha on December 19, 2001. On the positive side, we note that at least 
open racism has ended with the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa.  
So far so bad, one is tempted to say. But this rather negative security 
environment in the Indian Ocean Rim still has potential to grow considerably 
worse, since most of the conflicts just mentioned already went beyond the borders 
of their 'original' sub region. This spill-over effect means that some of the conflicts 
could acquire an Indian-Ocean-wide relevance. However, the regional potential for 
conflict resolution – or at least: conflict amelioration – is considerably less 
developed than the war fighting capabilities of the states involved. Since most 
conflicts and civil wars are still fought with small arms mainly, those warring states 
do not even need a sophisticated arsenal – Somalia and the humiliation of the UN 
forces tasked with "restoring hope" is a good case in point.  
Some non-military threats to security did already acquire a trans-regional 
dimension: drug-trafficking, gun-running, fish-poaching and maritime piracy, more 
often than not connected with organized crime. Hotspots of piracy for example are 
first, the Bay of Bengal, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, and 
second, the Arabian Sea off the Somali coast. The following diagram gives an 
impression of the dimension of this problem, which threatens the security of the 
most important Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs): 
 
 
Diagram 1: Rise of Piracy in the Indian Ocean and Other Regions9 
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Therefore, from a political science point of view, it is quite surprising that up to 
now, no collective security regime has been created in the Indian Ocean that could 
                                                 
9 Diagram prepared by Mr. Hendrick Lehmann for the Panchayati Raj Project, data 
compiled on the basis of International Maritime Bureau (IMB) publications. 
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have been able to ameliorate such conflicts. Unfortunately, the newly established 
Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) does not 
include a military security dimension, just some rather fuzzy provisions for 
comprehensive security. The exclusion of a military dimension in IOR-ARC 
seemed to be reasonable at least for the initial phase of the new regime – a phase in 
which potential member states usually seek to keep the costs of accession as low as 
possible. However, the question of a military component of IOR-ARC in the shape 
of a naval collective security regime will resurface rather sooner than later, given 
the conflicts in this region.  
In this respect, it is interesting to note that during the nineties, members of the 
Indian Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (IDSA) published a score of 
articles in magazines like Strategic Analysis or Maritime Studies, which dealt in 
one way or another with the creation of a regime of naval cooperation of 
intraregional navies in the Indian Ocean.10 One author fittingly called his proposal 
"Panchayati Raj" for the Indian Ocean.11 The original Panchayat system is part of 
the traditional Indian communal self-government. This "Council of Five" (this is 
the translation of Panchayat) not only took decisions in the name of the village, but 
tried to ameliorate and accommodate caste interests within the village. Today, the 
Panchayat concept belongs to the political language of South Asia as a metaphor12 
for cooperative conflict resolution and decision-making between partners with 
equal rights. In this sense, the expression is used for the proposed naval security 
regime.  
Like so many innovative ideas, these Panchayati Raj plans have not (yet) found 
an official echo in the higher echelons of politics for reasons that will be elaborated 
later in this article. However, these plans of a naval Panchayat can be seen as a 
creative attempt to transfer confidence- and security-building measures, Indian 
style, to naval forces. That alone makes it worthwhile to analyse the ideas 
concerning their feasibility. Even more important is the fact that such plans are 
coming from India, where many hard-liners are still dreaming of a "mare indicum" 
reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and from the shores of the 
Arabian Sea or the Gulf of Bengal to Durban and Perth. It is possible to argue, 
then, that the Indian economic problems, which at least delay the modernization of 
the Indian Navy for several years, may have created a ”window of opportunity” 
favoring a naval collective security regime.  
 
                                                 
10 See  Banerjee, Dipankar.: "Indian Ocean Zone of Peace: Need for a New Approach",  
Strategic Analysis, November 1992, p. 713-731; Bhaskar, C. Uday: "Regional Naval 
Cooperation", Strategic Analysis, November 1992, p. 733-746; Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul: 
"Naval Cooperation: India and the Indian Ocean", Strategic Analysis, June 1996, p. 319-
336.  
11 Bhaskar, C. Uday, op. cit., p. 745-746. 
12 Taken as a metaphor, the original meaning of a "Council of Five" is not longer relevant. 
In the modern political science language, it just means "Council". 
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T H E  P R O J E C T  
 
Be that as it may, I am of the opinion that the Indian Ocean Rim Region as one of 
three maritime 'mega regions' does have many things in common with the Asia 
Pacific. Therefore, I and my research team took up the idea of a Panchayati Raj 
system for the Indian Ocean and tried to find ways to make it work. The working 
hypothesis claimed that a naval or maritime collective security regime, based on 
mutual trust and cooperation and mirroring the experiences of the Asia-Pacific, 
would be a) sensible and b) feasible in the Indian Ocean, too.  
The research project can be summarized as follows: In a first step, the team 
collected already existing ideas from the region itself to test them in terms of their 
feasibility. The results of the feasibility study were used for drafting of a catalogue 
of confidence and security building measures. In a second step, the team introduced 
this catalogue to political scientists, politicians and other relevant persons from 
important Indian Ocean Rim states for discussion on conferences or meetings. The 
input of these persons were meant to form the basis for a blueprint of a naval (now: 
maritime13) collective security regime suitable for the problems in the Indian Ocean 
region at large which the team planned to draft in a third step. 
 
A  n e o r e a l i s t  a p p r o a c h   
 
The theoretical foundation of this research project was a modern variant of Hans 
Morgenthau's realism.14 The neorealist approach still perceives "power" as a basic 
category, but foreign policies of states are not reduced to that.15 Instead, neorealists 
think that on the international level, states act in a highly structured, interdependent 
system. This system may still be basically anarchic, but there are formal and 
informal rules and principles which have to be observed to avoid a "pariah status". 
Nevertheless, many neorealists16 are also convinced that conflict resolution through 
cooperation is futile. The basic assumptions of structural neorealism are as follows: 
 
• States are unitary rational actors 
• States give priority to improving their security 
• States are parts of an international system marked by anarchy. 
 
                                                 
13 The reasons for this change in terminology will be explained below. 
14 Morgenthau, Hans: Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.  New 
York: Knopf 1973 (5th ed). 
15 Schmidt, Manfred G.:  Wörterbuch zur Politik.  Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag 1995, p. 
648. 
16 For example, proponents of structural realism like Waltz, Kenneth: Theory of 
International Politics.  New York: Random House 1979; Buzan, Barry/Jones, 
Charles/Little, Richard: The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism.  New 
York: Columbia University Press 1993. 
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In my opinion, the "traditional" version of neorealism overemphasizes the aspect of 
interstate competition. Therefore, we prefer the approach of cooperative realism, 
heavily influenced by Robert Keohane's contractualism or functionalism.17 This 
approach eliminates the bias toward competition and emphasizes the possibility of 
increasing national security by international cooperation. Through cooperation, the 
classical result of the famous prisoner's dilemma would be broken.18 Therefore, the 
approach of cooperative realism/contractualism was much more suitable for this 
project than the classical neorealist balance of power approaches. 
Concerning the methodology, comparative methods as well as qualitative 
(contents analysis) and quantitative (statistical) methods were applied. Also, non-
representative, semi-structured guideline-interviews with relevant specialists, naval 
officers and politicians of important Indian Ocean Rim states (i.e., India, Australia 
and South Africa as the potential hegemonic powers of the Indian Ocean) were 
undertaken to sound out official and non-official opinions towards the planned 
regime.  
 
 
D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  M o d e l s  
 
The problem of maritime security in the Indian Ocean can be approached on three 
levels: a) transparency building measures, b) confidence building measures, and c) 
security building measures. The first two levels deal with either the conclusion of 
bilateral treaties or the creation of a low-key regime (in the sense, that no 
institutions are going to be created), the third level aims at creating a collective 
security system (an institutionalised regime). Following are several examples of 
measures on the three levels which have already been proposed from regional 
scholars.19 
 
 
Transparency Building Measures: 
 
• Advanced notice of naval exercises 
• Advanced notice of movement of ships 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 For cooperative realism, see Keohane, Robert/Nye, Joseph:  Power and Interdependence.  
Boston and London 1979. For Keohane's  more modern contractualism, see Keohane, 
Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984. 
18 On the prisoner's dilemma, see Axelrod, Robert M.:  The Evolution of Cooperation.  New 
York: Basic Books 1984. 
19 See for example Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul:  "Naval Cooperation: India and the Indian 
Ocean",  Strategic Analysis, June 1996, pp. 319-336. 
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Confidence Building Measures: 
 
• Conduct of joint multilateral naval and coast guard exercises 
• Conduct of joint naval training 
• Pooling of resources/experiences in ship design, construction 
• Conduct of joint naval hydrographic operations 
• Joint task force for policing at sea 
• Agreement on avoidance of incidence at high sea 
 
 
Security Building Measures: 
 
• Creation of a multilateral Indian Ocean forum for security discussions 
• Annual conference on naval (or: maritime) cooperation in the Indian 
Ocean 
• Creation of a system of checks and balances to prevent hegemonic 
claims of regional and extra-regional powers 
 
 
Of special interest for the research team was a feasible structure or regime which 
could give those measures proposed some degree of institutionalization and 
duration. Since we were of the opinion that the Indian Ocean Rim region is – up to 
a certain degree – comparable to the Asia-Pacific (both being maritime regions 
with culturally/economically/politically very diverse rim states), we "borrowed" 
three different maritime security regimes from the Asia-Pacific. The models 
elaborated below have different grades of institutionalization and legal reach, i.e., 
they either belong to the unofficial "second track-diplomacy" or to the official "first 
track". It should be noted, however, that these models were employed first of all as 
a starting point for discussion. It was never our intention to propagate an uncritical 
transfer of one or all of these models into the Indian Ocean.  
 
 
A  N a v a l  S y m p o s i u m  
 
A naval symposium or conference, being held annually or biannually, would form 
the lowest possible level for a security regime. It would have the advantage of a 
low grade of institutionalization and a low grade of legal obligation which would 
help to reduce both political and financial costs for potential members. The 
conference would not be a political forum, but rather a "get-together of friendly 
navies"20 of the Indian Ocean littoral countries. Both Milan in the Bay of Bengal 
and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) could provide useful models 
for an Indian Ocean Rim Naval Symposium (IORNS). WPNS could be useful 
because it succeeded so far to: 
                                                 
20 Ministry of Defence, Government of India: Annual Report 1999-2000. Delhi 2000, p. 31. 
 
                          PETER LEHR 10 
 
"create an environment that [assists] in building confidence and 
enhancing cooperation through, inter alia: personal contacts, 
transparency, exchange of fleet programmes, observation and prior 
notification of fleet exercises, information sharing, port visits… and 
exchange of information on naval procurement and retirement 
programmes…"21  
 
Milan could be useful because it shows that a regionally focused regime can be 
extended gradually to eventually cover the whole region. This argument will be 
developed more fully below.  
 
 
A  S e c o n d  T r a c k  O r g a n i z a t i o n  a s  a  M i d d l e - L e v e l  A p p r o a c h  
 
A second model which was definitely worth to be discussed in the context of the 
Indian Ocean is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). 
CSCAP intends to bring together participating countries and territories in the Asia-
Pacific by way of multi-sectoral member committees composed of academics, 
business persons, journalists, ex-politicians, elder statesmen and government 
officials (who participate in their private capacities only). A comparable Council 
for Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean (CSCIO) would thus basically be a 
semi-official forum with a low grade of institutionalization and obligation, but with 
a more comprehensive agenda than a naval conference.  
 
 
A Reg iona l  Forum 
 
An Indian Ocean Rim Regional Forum (IORRF), patterned after the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), would be the most ambitious approach with at least a 
chance of implementation. Just like ARF, a forum in the Indian Ocean would still 
have a minimalized institutional structure, but it would be an official "first track" 
forum with a high legal reach. Such a forum would provide an opportunity for 
government officials at a high level to discuss political and security issues of 
concern and to develop cooperative measures which might be taken to contribute to 
peace and stability in the region. The forum would have a formal agenda, 
structured meetings and legalistic procedures. The consensus method would be 
used and decisions would be implemented as "soft law" (informal agreements).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Mills, Greg: South Africa and Security Building in the Indian Ocean. Canberra 1998, p. 
78. 
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S o m e  T h o u g h t s  A b o u t  P o s s i b l e  O u t c o m e s  
 
Since most of the models for a security framework in the Indian Ocean under 
discussion today are taken from comparable structures in the Asia-Pacific, it is of 
some interest to compare the Asia-Pacific's "multilateral architecture" with that of 
the Indian Ocean end of 2002. For brevity's sake, two graphical sketches will have 
to do. The first diagram gives an impression of economic and security regimes in 
the Asia-Pacific on three different levels: 
 
Diagram 2: Multilateral Frameworks in the Asia-Pacific 
 
 
On the sub-regional level, we only find ASEAN with also deals informally with 
security matters. On the transregional level, connecting the sub-regions Southeast 
Asia and East Asia, there is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) as a 
low-level, unofficial second track regime. On the regional level, theoretically open 
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for all Asia-Pacific states, we have the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)22 as an 
official first track security framework and the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as its semi-official second track. The economic regime, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)23 forms the role-model for IOR-ARC. 
In the Indian Ocean, the current situation in regard of economic and security 
frameworks is like that: 
 
 
Diagram 3: Multilateral Frameworks in the Indian Ocean 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 On ARF see Garofano, John: "Flexibility or Irrelevance: Ways Forward for the ARF", 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, S. 74-94. 
23 On APEC see Ravenhill, John: APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. 
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It is easy to see that there are more sub-regional regimes/organizations than in the 
Asia-Pacific, and that there is also a low-level naval symposium somewhat 
comparable to the WPNS, albeit both Milan East and Milan West are even more 
informal than WPNS and a bit shorter in their geographical reach. What is totally 
lacking is a regional security framework comparable to the ARF. 
In my opinion, an annual maritime conference patterned according to the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) but on an all-Indian Ocean basis could 
be the most appropriate way to get a maritime security regime under way, since 
this would be a very low key venture without any real institutionalization. More 
ambitious ventures like a regional forum might be premature for the Indian Ocean 
for reasons which will be elaborated below. 
 
 
E x p e r t  I n t e r v i e w s  
 
To find out whether our assumptions about workable security frameworks in the 
Indian Ocean are shared within the epistemic community of the Indian Ocean or 
not, the research team conducted expert interviews (i.e., specialists in the fields of 
security studies and international relations, naval officers and, if possible, 
government officials) in South Africa, South Asia (with a focus on India and 
Pakistan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) and Australia. The 
aims of these expert interviews were first, to sound out the feasibility of a maritime 
security regime in the Indian Ocean and second, to work out possible items to be 
included in such a regime. The results of the interviews were used to sketch out a 
first draft for a model of an Indian Ocean-wide maritime security regime.  
For the expert interviews, we developed a semi-structured guideline 
questionnaire developed for our interviews consists of 38 questions arranged in the 
following parts: 
 
• Common Cooperative Security Theory. This theoretical part focuses on 
the applicability and usability of our Western terms of reference in the 
Indian Ocean Region as a non-Western setting.  
• Current Security Environment in the Indian Ocean and the Role of 
Navies. This set of questions deals with the current security environment in 
general and the role of navies and naval power in the Indian Ocean in the 
perception of our respondents.  
• Defining the Indian Ocean as a Foreign Policy Arena. In this part, our 
intentions is to find out whether, in the opinion of the respondents, the 
Indian Ocean forms a region of its own in more than a geographical sense 
and if yes, whether this is mirrored in the foreign policy of the respondent's 
home country. A second set of questions is asked to see whether there is a 
perceived necessity of an Indian-Ocean-wide regime.  
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• Regime Structure. This part deals with the question of how a regime 
should look like, if the respondent has answered positively before. While 
first set of questions in this part deals with the structure itself, a second set 
of questions (in form of a table) covers possible contents for such a regime. 
Possible models and contents are taken from our models explained above 
and from the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). The box below contains 
the questions that were asked on this most crucial part of our interviews: 
 
1. If you were appointed by your government to develop a model for a security regime 
in the Indian Ocean, how would you proceed? 
 
2. Would an annual naval conference contribute to confidence-building and conflict 
resolution in the Indian Ocean? If yes, is there a chance that such a naval conference 
could be implemented in the near future? How should it look like? (grade of 
institutionalization/of official character/founding members) 
 
3. Would a semi-official network of think tanks, patterned after the Council for Security 
and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), contribute to confidence-building and 
conflict resolution in the Indian Ocean? If yes, what do you think about its 
feasibility? How should it look like? Which countries' think tanks should be 
members? 
 
4. Would a regional forum like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) contribute to 
confidence-building and conflict resolution in the Indian Ocean? What do you think 
about its feasibility? How should it be organized? (grade of 
institutionalization/official character/member states) 
 
5. A fourth model could be a "heavily institutionalized" regional forum (to be called 
"Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Indian Ocean" (CSCIO)), a 
"Helsinki for the Indian Ocean", so to say. Would such a large-scale organization 
make sense to you? If yes, what would be the time frame for its implementation and 
how could it look like?  
 
6. Organizations like an Indian Ocean Regional Forum or a 'Helsinki for the Indian 
Ocean' can only be established as the last step of a gradual evolution of trust and 
confidence starting with low-key conferences on non-controversial issues as the first 
step. Do you agree? 
 
7. Which decision making procedures would you prefer for the last two models we just 
talked about? Would you prefer a) consensus decisions, b) consensus-minus-one (the 
one being abstention) or c) majority decisions? 
 
8. Regional multilateral organizations in Europe, Africa and Latin America provide for 
an official conflict resolution mechanism, usually in the shape of a "High Council" 
ASEAN however, while having such a High Council prefers to manage disputes 
within its membership without resorting to its High Council. In your opinion, would 
an institutionalized regime like the regional forum need such a High Council? 
 
9. Now, let us talk about the contents of a security regime in the Indian Ocean. Which 
issues should be included in a annual naval conference, a council for security 
cooperation and a regional forum? 
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A  S H O R T  G L I M P S E  I N T O  T H E  R A N G E  O F  O P I N I O N S  
 
For the project, more than 50 elite interviews were conducted between August 
2000 and October 2001. Until the end of December 2000, members of the work 
group traveled to Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Prof. Cheema) and 
to India, Nepal and the United Arab Emirates (Peter Lehr/Maike Tuchner). In 
2001, interviews were conducted in Australia and Singapore (Peter Lehr and 
Hendrick Lehmann), in Australia and Thailand (Peter Lehr/Maike Tuchner) and 
(attempted) in South Africa (Clemens Spieß). Interestingly, the range of opinions 
garnered during these field trips could be divided into "Indian opinions" and "non-
Indian opinions", the latter category consisting of answers from Australia, 
Southeast Asia, and Pakistan – that is, from all countries except India. Also 
interestingly, we failed to get even one interview partner from South Africa: 
everybody seemed to be occupied by the political transformation of the country and 
its implications.24 
 
I n d i a n  P e r c e p t i o n s  
 
In regard of the first, theoretical part of the questionnaire, only two Indian 
interview partners responded. Both of them are of the opinion that the terms of 
Western political theory can be applied in a non-Western setting. However, they 
also pointed out that many of those terms, like Confidence Building Measures are 
coming with a certain 'Cold War baggage' in the sense that they may contain some 
negative connotations one should be aware of.  
All respondents perceived the current security environment in the Indian Ocean 
as stable and overall positive. It was described as basically a low threat 
environment. Compared with the superpower conflict in the seventies and eighties, 
the security situation has improved considerably since the beginning of the 
nineties. Also, there was a consensus among the respondents that those major sea 
powers which are capable of disrupting the SLOCs are agreed that the Indian 
Ocean should remain peaceful. So, in the opinion of all Indian respondents, today, 
there is no power competition visible in this area. Somewhat surprisingly, both the 
USN and the PLAN were not seen as threatening by Indian naval officers, too. 
Those respondents even denied the presence of 'blue water navies' capable for 
power projection other than the USN. 
On the other hand, non-state actors were pointed out as a possible threat to 
stability in the Indian Ocean. Frequently suggested were piracy (mainly in Bay of 
Bengal and the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea and the coastal waters of 
Somalia), mercenary actions or drug trafficking, gun running and illegal migration. 
                                                 
24 Some Australian respondents reported the same problems. 
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The respondents also agreed that the Indian Navy did create some unease in the 
past, especially in the eighties in Australia, Thailand, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh because of Indian plans to construct a major naval base at Port Blair on 
the Andaman island chain as part of the Fortress Andamans and Nicobars 
(FORTAN). The reason for this was, in the opinion of the respondents, partly a 
capability mismatch between the Indian Navy and other IOR navies, partly a 
misperception about Indian intentions. For this reason, a process of confidence 
building had been encouraged by the Indian Navy, like invitations for port visits or 
invitation of delegates from countries with only a small navy or no navy at all. 
Milan25 in the Bay of Bengal was mentioned as a successful example of such 
confidence building measures. In 2001, Milan was successfully introduced as 
Milan West to the Arabian Sea, where naval cooperation already exists between the 
Indian Navy and the navies of Iran and Oman. 
Concerning the Indian Ocean as a foreign policy area, the Indian respondents 
opined that up to now, India had not actually developed an Indian Ocean policy, 
not even an Indian Ocean economic policy. Despite some efforts of some 
institutions, the respondents doubt that there were a maritime notion as such in 
India. The maritime history of India is thought to be missing, and the same is said 
to be true for an Indian Ocean awareness. India is part of the Indian Ocean region, 
but that is not very important for its foreign policy, especially so since all conflicts 
with neighbouring states are situated at India's land borders. In the perception of 
the respondents, an Indian Ocean awareness began to develop because of the 
importance of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) only very recently. 
The idea of establishing a maritime security regime in the Indian Ocean was 
received with great scepticism, even by the erstwhile proponents of a Panchayati 
Raj system in this ocean. All in all, the respondents did not see the possibility of a 
free discussion of sensitive security affairs in the Indian Ocean in the near future 
since the situation and the security environment was not ripe. However, it was 
frequently pointed out that a larger dialogue relationship was building between 
some Indian Ocean Rim states. Therefore, the idea of a maritime conference – 
albeit dealing with strictly non-sensitive, e.g. non-military, matters – was perceived 
as a possible way to establish such a dialogue on a regular basis. Again, Milan in 
the Bay of Bengal was mentioned as a genuine Indian initiative in this respect. But 
even an emulation of the Asia-Pacific Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) was deemed to be feasible in the Indian Ocean in the long 
run. On the other hand, the use of the term "naval" was strongly criticized, since 
this term implies the coverage of sensitive issues which would make the conference 
idea a non-starter. Instead, the term "maritime" was recommended as a more 
inclusive and comprehensive term. Since this point was also raised in other 
countries, we concurred and dropped "naval" in favor for "maritime". 
It was also pointed out to us that many initiatives would founder simply for the 
smaller states' lack of money to send delegates for such a purpose. This problem 
                                                 
25 Hindi expression for "meeting". 
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had to be taken under consideration when a maritime conference were to be 
implemented.  
 
T h e  R a n g e  o f  N o n - I n d i a n  P e r c e p t i o n s  
 
Some dissatisfaction was expressed by many respondents over the existing security 
environment in the Indian Ocean. The build-up of blue water navies was viewed 
with scepticism and a certain amount of suspicion, especially from respondents 
from the smaller countries. By the Pakistanis, the build-up of the Indian Navy was 
seen as an attempt to project its power in congruence with old Indian ambitions to 
control the Indian Ocean from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. Some Sri 
Lankan opined that the Indian attempts to build up a credible sea power indicates 
that India regarded itself as the heir to the British and tended to behave like them. 
However, almost everybody recognized India as an important actor in the Indian 
Ocean. 
Most interviewees felt that the existing Laws of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 
needs to be improved. They do not adequately address the concerns of the smaller 
nations as well as those of the hinterland states. In their opinion, the LOSC could 
provide the much desired umbrella to the smaller regional states. Since the land 
resources are depleting rather rapidly, it was viewed all the more essential to device 
a method that can adequately protect the share of the nations in the resources of the 
Indian Ocean. Many smaller nations lack the ability to assert their legitimate 
concerns which, they felt, could be safeguarded by the Law of the Sea Convention 
(LOSC). 
Concerning the role of navies in the Indian Ocean, it was generally 
acknowledged that navies could be useful instruments of foreign policy. It was 
specifically stressed by almost everyone that the role of a navy depends upon a 
country's location. Both the Singaporeans and the Sri Lankans stressed the limited 
nature of their own navy's role. Ordinarily the island nations tend to devote more 
resources and build a relatively strong navy but the Sri Lankan Navy has proven to 
be an exception to the generally prevalent rule. The explanation given by most Sri 
Lankan interviewees was that maritime traditions are non-existent in Sri Lanka. 
Besides, the governments in Colombo were never able to allocate adequate 
resources for building a strong navy despite the fact that developments in the 
Indian Ocean have direct impact on the destiny of Sri Lanka. It was only after the 
beginning of the LTTE uprising that Sri Lanka began to allocate some resources to 
its navy, too. The Singaporeans felt that their navy's role is mainly confined to 
patrolling Singapore's coastal waters and supplementing its coast guard's activities. 
However, Singapore and Indonesia conduct joint naval exercises (primarily anti-
submarine exercises). The Singaporean respondents also stressed that India is taken 
more seriously than was the case in the past after the 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistani 
respondents on the other hand saw a much bigger role for their navy. Apart from 
safeguarding its coast line and protecting its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), 
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its submarine capability is aimed to deny any undue advantage the Indian Navy 
may try to exploit in a classical sea denial role.  
In respect of the Indian Ocean as a region in itself, non-Indian respondents 
proved to be as sceptic as their Indian colleagues. The Indian Ocean is not a 
homogenous entity, instead, it is seen as consisting of many sub regions with their 
own peculiar requirements. 
Being asked about a naval security regime in the Indian Ocean, all respondents 
agreed that cooperation in the soft areas would be more feasible than cooperation 
in the "hard" and sensitive areas like military security. Yet all Australians and 
many Sri Lankans stressed that it could be desirable to have some kind of 
cooperative venture even in the field of naval activities – at least at a later stage. 
While recognizing the difficulties involved in such a pursuit, it was highlighted that 
all multilateral cooperation began in a modest way and the subsequent incremental 
processes helped them to evolve into a very comprehensive organization.  
Some of the Sri Lankans and Pakistanis suggested that cooperation may begin 
at a sub regional level with the expressed aims to cover the entire Indian Ocean at a 
later stage. Among the models and patterns for a future cooperative regime 
introduced to them, the general consensus was that an annual conference appeared 
to be more feasible. But just like their Indian colleagues, the non-Indian 
respondents took issue with the term "naval" and suggested the term "maritime" 
instead. This Annual Maritime Conference should be an inclusive one, in which all 
interested Indian Ocean Rim states could participate, including the outside powers 
and the hinterland states. Admittedly it would be a large organization but 
consensus could easily be secured in the soft areas initially and later efforts could 
be directed to deal with issues of hard areas. 
 
 
S O M E  D I S C E R N I B L E  T R E N D S  
 
From the evaluation of our interviews and of the literature on different possibilities 
of cooperation in the Indian Ocean, we were able to glean the following trends, 
which correlated with the results of our archive and library research: 
 
T h e  P r o b l e m  o f  " W e s t e r n "  T e r m i n o l o g y  
 
In the preparation stage of our project we realized that some of the terminology we 
used was understood in a different way than we had expected by some of the 
specialists already contacted. Some terms were even rejected altogether. For 
example, from some Southeast Asian respondents, the term Confidence Building 
Measures (CBM) was discarded for various reasons in favour of Trust Building 
Measures (TBM). For this reason, we decided to include a part on terminology into 
our questionnaire. During our travels to South Asia and Southeast Asia, we soon 
found out that – with one exception – all interviewees accepted our working 
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definitions. Most interviewees simply pointed out that some of our definitions 
could contain some negative "Cold War baggage".  
However, the application of the term Naval Security was generally criticized. 
All respondents suggested to drop it in favour of the more comprehensive and less 
problematic term Maritime Security.  
 
G e o p o l i t i c a l  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  I n d i a n  O c e a n  
 
Indian and non-Indian respondents had different perceptions on the overall security 
situation in the Indian Ocean. In the perception of the Indian interviewees, the 
geopolitical and geo-economical environment in the Indian Ocean after the end of 
the superpower conflict is positive and stable. Security problems are posed only by 
non-state actors like drug traffickers, small arms traffickers and pirates, especially 
in the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca. Illicit fishing was also pointed out 
as a source of conflict, both in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. According 
to some respondents from the Indian Navy, there were some incidents of armed 
clashes between Thai trawlers and Indian patrol vessels. The trawlers involved 
were armed with automatic weapons and some even with bazookas.  
Non-Indian respondents drew a much more negative picture of the security 
environment in the Indian Ocean. Nuclearization of India and Pakistan and the civil 
wars in Somalia and Indonesia were frequently mentioned as potential sources for 
conflict with Indian Ocean-wide dimensions, especially by our Australian partners 
who frequently pointed out the "robust response" that Australia has given in regard 
of the tests.  
The question whether the Indian Ocean can be defined as more than a mere 
geographical region was met with great scepticism by all respondents, Indian and 
non-Indian alike. Interestingly, most respondents did agree that the Indian Ocean 
has been a region in its own right in the eighties. The reason for this was seen in a 
spill-over of the superpower conflict between the USA and the USSR from the 
Atlantic and the Pacific into this region. This resulted in a perception of common 
security concerns and in initiatives like the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 
(IOZOP) proposal. Now that the superpower conflict is gone, the idea of a region 
dissipates again. The reason behind this is, in the opinion even of the Indian 
respondents, a general lack of a "maritime tradition" and a general lack of 
knowledge about the importance of the ocean for the Indian Ocean Rim states. This 
could be a formidable obstacle for any kind of regime for the whole Indian Ocean.  
 
T h e  I d e a  o f  a  M a r i t i m e  S e c u r i t y  R e g i m e  
 
The idea of a regular maritime conference patterned after the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS) found general acceptance both with the Indian and the 
non-Indian respondents. However, nearly all respondents expressed doubts that 
IOR-ARC could be a feasible platform for establishing such a conference. In the 
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perception of our respondents, IOR-ARC already foundered for various reasons. A 
maritime conference or symposium should therefore be an independent venture. 
All respondents also pointed out that it would be very difficult to convince 
responsible policy makers of the necessity of such a regime. Most respondents 
therefore agreed with our basic (neorealist) assumption that a maritime regime in 
the Indian Ocean could only be implemented when a dominant state – or a 
dominant group of states – would push the initiative forward. Interestingly, many 
Indian and non-Indian respondents named the Federal Republic of Germany in this 
context as one extra-regional possibility. 
The interviews also contained some unexpected answers which we found quite 
surprising. From these answers, given by the overwhelming majority of all 
respondents, we could glean the following "scientific surprises": 
 
T h e  I n d i a n  O c e a n  i s  n o t  s e e n  a s  a  r e g i o n  i n  i t s e l f  
 
 In regard of a common perception of the Indian Ocean, we realized that it is being 
perceived as such only by parts of the epistemic community, i.e. by specialists on 
the Indian Ocean from academia. All other respondents – naval officers and 
government officials – opined that the Indian Ocean as a peaceful ocean does not 
draw enough official interest to be thought of as more than a geographic region. In 
their view, the Indian Ocean definitely is neither a political region nor an economic 
region: 
 
• The attention of the political elite in India is directed West towards the 
long border with Pakistan due to the endless Kashmir conflict, North 
towards the even longer border with the People's Republic of China 
because of different opinions about the common boundary and East 
towards the border with Myanmar because of guerrilla activities and drug 
trafficking/gun running. In regard of the Indian Ocean, only its sub-regions 
Arabian Sea and Gulf of Bengal are of interest for Delhi because of its 
Look West and Look East policies – the Arabian Sea because of the 
security of Indian sea lines of communication (SLOC), the Gulf of Bengal 
because of its potential function as a bridge between India and ASEAN 
and, by extension, APEC. 
• The Australian political and business establishment, situated at the shores 
of the Pacific anyway, is interested almost exclusively in the Pacific 
Ocean, APEC and ARF. Adding to the neglect of the Indian Ocean is John 
Howard's administration's focus on domestic issues. Consequently, the 
only foreign policy issues under frequent discussion are illegal migrations 
from Southeast Asia. It should be noted, though, that the government of the 
federal state Western Australia with its capital Perth at the shore of the 
Indian Ocean, usually is more interested in Indian Ocean matters. 
However, the government at Perth is not powerful enough to give the 
Australian foreign and foreign economic policy a pro-Indian Ocean tilt. 
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• The establishment of South Africa is still occupied by the political 
transformation within the republic and the re-establishing of its former 
zone of influence in Southern Africa after the termination of Apartheid 
rule.  
 
In a nutshell, the Indian Ocean being a peaceful ocean devoid of potential military 
conflicts does not feature high on the foreign and security policy agenda of its most 
powerful rim states because of it being peaceful. This means for the time being, 
there are no incentives to look at and deal with the Indian Ocean or to try to 
establish a security regime there. 
 
I n t e r e s t  f o r  a  m a r i t i m e  s e c u r i t y  r e g i m e  i s  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
t h e  e p i s t e m i c  c o m m u n i t y  
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, only the members of the epistemic community 
seem to be interested in a maritime security regime in the Indian Ocean. But even 
the most optimistic of them are of the opinion that such a regime would not come 
about in the foreseeable future. One reason has already been mentioned: because 
the Indian Ocean is a peaceful ocean with no immediate military threat, there is no 
incentive to try to establish a maritime security regime for the whole Indian Ocean 
Rim. Non-military threats such as piracy are not seen as affecting the whole Indian 
Ocean. Thus they should be dealt with on an appropriate sub-regional level like the 
Bay of Bengal.  
Another reason given reveals a certain degree of disillusionment within the 
circle of specialists, especially those active in second-track diplomacy. This 
disillusionment does not restrict itself on the Indian Ocean second track, it also 
covers seemingly successful Asia-Pacific second tracks like CSCAP.26 
The feeling that there is an impenetrable layer between first track and second 
track activities in the sense that creative new ideas are not taken up by relevant 
policy makers themselves is, in our opinion, more dangerous for future attempts at 
establishing security and other regimes (not only) in the Indian Ocean: This could 
lead to a lack of "free floating" concepts and ideas exactly when they are needed – 
sometime in the future. 
 
I O R - A R C  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  a l r e a d y  d e a d  
 
Another not so surprising result of our interviews concerns the future of the Indian 
Ocean Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC): In the opinion of most 
respondents, IOR-ARC does not have a future. All respondents except one 
expressed grave doubts about IOR-ARC's potential for further meaningful 
development. It was frequently pointed out that fewer and fewer delegates are 
attending IOR-ARC meetings. One could argue that empirical data on IOR-ARC 
                                                 
26 Confidential information. 
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suggest exactly the contrary, but if this negative perception spreads, it would be a 
kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In that case, it would be futile to use IOR-ARC 
as a platform for a future security regime – which was our hope in the early stages 
of the project. 
 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
The interviews conducted showed that a maritime regime in the shape of a regular 
symposium comparable to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) would 
indeed contribute to the overall security in this region. As such, an Indian Ocean 
Rim Naval Symposium (IORNS) would be sensible. The feasibility of such a 
regime, however, especially for the whole Indian Ocean Rim, was seen very 
skeptical, at least for the foreseeable future.  
 But the interviews with our South Asian and Southeast Asian interview 
partners also contained a possible solution for this problem: creating a maritime 
regime in one part of the Indian Ocean "where the trouble makers are not present", 
as one Indian respondent quipped, and slowly and gradually extending it to other 
parts of the region to eventually cover the whole Indian Ocean Rim. An example 
for this approach could be Milan East in the Bay of Bengal. This "social gathering 
of naval personnel" from navies present in the Bay of Bengal was initiated by India 
as an attempt to appease concerns in regard of its naval build-up. Because of its 
success as a confidence building measure, India organized a similar venture in the 
Arabian Sea in the year 2000 as Milan West with the navies of Iran and Oman as 
participants. Since the Bay of Bengal is a part of the Indian Ocean without "trouble 
makers" (as defined by Indians), it could be a useful focus for either beefing up 
Milan or implementing a more ambitious symposium.  
 The real problem in regard of Indian Ocean security is to be found elsewhere, 
however: there seems to be an impenetrable barrier between non-official second 
track affairs conducted mainly by members of the epistemic community and the 
official first track diplomacy conducted by government officials. In other words: 
developing new ideas about ways to live together more peacefully are the easy part 
of the job. The difficult part is trying to get heard, by way of policy counselling 
and/or lobbying. Policy counselling implies an already existing access to relevant 
policy-makers, lobbying implies the existence of some pressure groups with a 
similar set of interests. Both of them imply the existence of (lots of) patience and 
perseverance. Jesuits are a good example for those virtues needed: if one of there 
ideas gets turned town by the pope, they obey. But they will get back to him half a 
year later with the same idea, again and again. Perhaps they will also pray for a 
miracle to take place, but they will not leave it at that. In the end, they probably 
will not exactly get what they wanted in the very beginning, but the might get what 
they need, and a little more.  
In the Asia-Pacific, the epistemic community got its miracle by way of the 
dissolution of the USSR and the dawning of the new era of "globalisation" and 
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"liberalization", which helped to bring about policy changes in the USA which was 
largely responsible for the creation of first the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) as an economic regime and then the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a 
security regime. Both are still working. The epistemic community in the Indian 
Ocean only got half a miracle which helped bringing about the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) as a feeble attempt to establish 
an economic regime. Since IOR-ARC has lost most of its initial steam, and since a 
security regime still is out of question, the epistemic community is well advised to 
both re-examine their geographical definition of the phenomenon colloquially 
called "Indian Ocean" – which is probably not workable – and to develop some 
patience – a virtue that is frequently lacking given the rapidly changing trends in 
(fundable) research subjects on international relations. The Panchayati Raj concept 
is simply too valuable to face such a premature death. 
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